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Abstract 
This paper attempts to analyse the European Union’s (EU) cultural diplomacy (CD) efforts in five 
Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, 
hereinafter ‘Central Asia’). Beginning in the early 2000s, EU Member States looked at the region with 
increased interest. Aside from major engagements on trade, energy and security, education and inter-
cultural dialogue were stressed as priority areas in the 2007 EU Strategy for Central Asia. To measure 
EU effectiveness as a CD actor in Central Asia, a comparative dimension is proposed by analysing the 
role Russia has pursued. At law and policy level, since Putin’s return to the Presidency in 2012, Russia 
has reaffirmed its ambitions to strengthen both hard and soft presence in Central Asia, viewing the 
region within its sphere of influence. This engagement was reiterated in the 2015 Strategy of National 
Security and in the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept. To draw a comparison, actors’ CD effectiveness is 
measured in terms of willingness, capacity, and acceptance, based on the theoretical framework 
proposed by Kingah, Amaya and Van Langenhove1.  
This paper finds that European CD efforts had mixed results due to an inconsistent policy towards the 
region. Although EU cultural heritage and educational influence are widely acknowledged, Russia 
remains today the major foreign actor in Central Asia, displaying strong levels of attractiveness 
among citizenry and elites. Historical and cultural ties, but also institutional and economic efforts 
allowed Moscow to keep its leading position. However, Russia’s future regional leadership should not 
be taken for granted, as all Central Asian states have been looking at Moscow’s cultural engagement 
with increased scepticism. 
                                                            
 
1 KINGAH, Stephen, AMAYA, Ana B. and VAN LANGENHOVE, Luk, Requirements for Effective European Union Leadership in 
Science and Cultural Diplomacy on (Inter)Regionalism in the South, EL-CSID Working Paper, Issue 1, 
http://cris.unu.edu/sites/cris.unu.edu/files/W-2016-3%20paper.pdf Retrieved on 14 November 2017. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last few years, the interest in the use of culture in the European Union’s (EU) external relations 
has been growing steadily. The topic has gained so much importance, that in a communiqué the 
European Commission (EC) has recently suggested to put it “at the heart of EU international 
relations”2. EU High Representative and Vice President of the Commission Federica Mogherini stated 
that “culture is a powerful tool to build bridges between people […] against those trying to divide us 
[…] which is why cultural diplomacy must be at the core of our relationship with today’s world”. Tibor 
Navracsis, the European Commissioner for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, emphasised that 
“culture is the hidden gem of our foreign policy [and] it has a great role to play in making the EU a 
stronger global actor”3. 
 
This ambition to enhance the EU’s image and role in the world by means of culture stems from the 
general perception that cultural diplomacy (CD) would enhance a country’s or organisation’s image 
and thus soft power4. It is seen as a friendly way of making one’s country and culture –and possibly 
also norms– more attractive to others, who might even adapt to it. So where hard power pushes, soft 
power pulls. Joseph Nye, when developing the concept, set out three primary sources of soft power: 
political values, culture and foreign policy5. Soft power and CD are nearly always being linked, be it by 
countries or even by organisations like UNESCO6. As such, interest in soft power has been rising at 
the national, regional and international levels. 
 
Whilst the term ‘soft power’ has gained more and more popularity within the realm of international 
relations, so have soft power analyses. An example is offered by the Soft Power 30, an index 
measuring countries’ attraction published by Portland Communications and the USC Center on Public 
Diplomacy. Two of the six objective criteria mentioned are culture and education. In the 2016 ranking, 
the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany held the top three places. Interestingly, 
many other European countries held a place in the top-30, as for instance France (5th place), 
Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain (respectively 8th-12th place)7. In 2017, the 
ranking shifted, with France, the UK and the US on the top three. Other European countries remained 
at around the same place.  
 
However, there is no need to always see culture as a soft power tool and as a means to showcase 
European culture. CD, when referring to the definition proposed by the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, 
would rather be “a course of actions, which are based on and utilise the exchange of ideas, values, 
traditions and other aspects of culture or identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-
cultural cooperation, promote national interests and beyond”8. It could thus also be perceived as a 
means to strengthen ties and as a mediation tool between countries and regions.  
 
Defined in the Council Conclusions of 22 June 2015 as a “region of strategic importance”9, Central 
Asia (CA) has been targeted by increasing European activity since the early 2000s. Aside from major 
engagements on trade, energy and security, education and inter-cultural dialogue were stressed as 
                                                            
 
2 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, A New Strategy to Put Culture at the Heart of EU International Relations, 8 June 2016. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2074_en.htm Retrieved on 13 November 2017. 
3 Ibidem. 
4 NYE, Joseph, Soft Power: Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2004.  
5 PORTLAND, The Soft Power 30, a Global Ranking of Soft Power, 2016. https://portland-communications.com/pdf/The-Soft-
Power-30-Report-2016.pdf Retrieved on 16 August 2017. 
6 UNESCO, The Soft Power of Culture, http://www.unesco.org/culture/culture-sector-knowledge-management-
tools/12_Info%20Sheet_Soft%20Power.pdf Retrieved on 14 November 2017.  
7 PORTLAND, The Soft Power 30…, op. cit. p.5.  
8 INSTITUTE FOR CULTURAL DIPLOMACY, What is Cultural Diplomacy? What is Soft Power?, 2017. 
http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/index.php?en_culturaldiplomacy Retrieved on 15 December 2017. 
9 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Council conclusions on the EU Strategy for Central Asia, 22 June 2015, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/06/22/fac-central-asia-conclusions/  Retrieved on 15 
November 2017. 
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priority areas in the 2007 EU Strategy for CA and remain pertinent for future EU actions. By 
establishing delegations in four out of five countries of the region (Turkmenistan being at present the 
exception), Brussels has sought to gain more visibility and influence, especially in comparison to other 
regional competitors. Russia, for example, has always remained a major regional actor for historical 
and geographical reasons. Additionally, a rise in Moscow’s general soft attraction was also witnessed 
in the past years10. 
 
Even though the EC has been treating Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan as one unique entity, it is rather problematical to argue that the five discussed countries 
form a political region. As it is hard to generalise in terms of CD, it is attempted to also discuss the 
countries separately, and not only as a region. 
 
This paper has been written in the framework of the project for European Leadership in Cultural, 
Science and Innovation Diplomacy (EL-CSID), analysing the relevance of cultural, science and 
innovation diplomacy for the EU’s external relations in the evolving global context. This paper looks 
at the effectiveness of the EU’s CD towards CA. In doing so, a comparative dimension is proposed by 
analysing the role Russia has pursued. To date, such a research has not been conducted on the region, 
although both Russia and the EU have been engaging themselves diplomatically these past decades. 
In addition to culture, this paper also includes educational efforts in the analysis, therefore proposing 
a more extensive definition of CD. 
 
To discuss and compare the effectiveness of the EU’s and Russia’s policy, the paper relies on the 
framework proposed by Kingah, Amaya and Van Langenhove11 in the inception paper of Work Package 
5 for EL-CSID project. The framework analyses the effectiveness of the EU’s promotion of regional 
and inter-regional processes in the south through cultural, science and innovation diplomacy. Given 
the specific features of each country and those of the region itself, the framework was slightly 
adapted. As such, this paper looks at willingness (chapter four), capacity (chapter five) and acceptance 
(chapter six) of both the EU and Russia regarding CD in CA. Willingness delineates the scope of actors’ 
ambition in CD, while capacity covers elements that pertain to breadth, depth, quality and quantity of 
resources mobilised for effective CD. Finally, acceptance refers to the extent of credibility and ability 
to attract through culture that an actor is able to appeal. A general presentation of the region in the 
post-Soviet era and an overview on bilateral and regional approaches precede the assessments of CD 
indicators.  
 
2. Geopolitics of Central Asia  
 
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the five former Soviet Republics of CA faced three 
different and interrelated types of challenges as new born entities: state- and nation-building 
processes, transitioning from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, and shaping their 
new place at the international level12. 
2.1 Nationalising States: What Space for Minorities? 
Since the Tsarist conquest of the region in the 19th century, CA has progressively become an ethnically 
diverse region. Multiple ethnic groups, often nomadic, were already living there, and many ethnic 
Russians moved later to CA in order to receive financial benefits. This trend dramatically accelerated 
during Stalin’s rule, with constant processes of massive delocalisation and re-localisation of ethnic 
                                                            
 
10 Russia has experienced a small rise in the Portland Soft Power index: whereas in 2015 it did not occupy a place in the Portland 
Soft Power 30, it took the 27th place in 2016 and rose to the 26th place in 2017. PORTLAND, The Soft Power 30…, op. cit., p.5.  
11 KINGAH, S., AMAYA, A. B. and VAN LANGENHOVE, L., Requirements for Effective…, op. cit. p.4. 
12 See ALLISON, Roy. Regionalism, regional structures and security management in Central Asia. International Affairs, vol. 80, 
no. 3, 2004, pp. 463-483; LARUELLE, Marlene and PEYROUSE, Sebastien. Globalizing Central Asia: geopolitics and the challenges 
of economic development, New York: ME Sharpe, 2013. 
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groups. Created in the 1920s under razmezhevanie, that is, the national delimitation process assigning 
territories to ethnic groups, the new-born republics inherited Soviet institutions and practices, which 
continued to exist during the post-Soviet era.  
 
Nation-building efforts became stronger after the collapse of the Soviet Union and were largely led by 
former Communist bureaucratic elites. As noted by Akçali, with the only exception of Kyrgyz leader 
Akaev, “all of the post-Soviet era leaders of CA […] were the First Secretaries of the Communist Parties 
in their own republics”13. Based on that common history, CA states have often been considered as 
examples of ‘nationalising states’, in which an ethnic majority aimed “to reinforce and promote its 
national identity upon the state, its institutions, symbols, and practices”14. As such, it could be argued 
that nation-building is imagined and pursued by former Soviet and ethnic majority elites, following a 
top-down approach that seeks power concentration. 
 
Of course, one should also note that nation-building processes in CA were partly facilitated by the 
consistent return migration flows of Russian minorities. Between 1989 and 2008, ethnic Russians in 
the region decreased by 42 per cent. Today Kazakhstan still possesses the largest Russian minority, 
accounting for about 23.7 per cent of the total population in 2009. However, return migration was also 
coupled with increasing migration of Central Asians seeking work in Russia. In Peyrouse’s view, this 
forced CA governments “to maintain legal, linguistic, cultural, educational, and informational links with 
the old imperial centre”15. 
2.2 Transitioning and Reliance on Natural Resources 
As a more dramatic challenge, CA states were also obliged in the 1990s to transition to market 
structures and to pursue economic integration at the international level, whilst corruption remained 
spectacular.  
Perhaps most importantly, market inefficiencies have been coupled with overwhelming reliance on 
natural resources export. At present, Kazakhstan possesses the world’s twelfth largest oil reserves: 
Turkmenistan has negligible quantity of oil in the soil but ranks fourth for the largest world gas 
reserves after Iran, Russia, and Qatar. When it comes to the other CA countries, Uzbekistan has 
extensive gold deposits, Kyrgyzstan exports coal, gold, and uranium among others, and the poorest 
resource-based economy, Tajikistan, has specialised in aluminium and cotton export. In the current 
phase of low commodity prices, CA states suffer the same fate as the Russian economy and are 
additionally facing a consistent decline in remittance from workers settled in Russia16. 
2.3 Between Bandwagoning and Isolationism in the Regional Arena 
As a consequence of contrasting political and economic priorities, CA leaders resorted to different 
policy choices at the international level in general, and within the post-Soviet bloc in particular. The 
most striking example of this phenomenon is to be noticed in regional memberships. It could be 
suggested that CA states resorted to two different strategies to interact in the neighbourhood: 
 
a) Bandwagoning. According to Allison, a number of CA states followed a path of 
accommodation with the regional leader, that is, Russia17. This could explain participation 
in more advanced regional structures such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and 
a deeper involvement in other security structures (Collective Security Treaty Organisation, 
                                                            
 
13 AKÇALI, Pinar, Nation-State Building in Central Asia: A lost Case?, p.96 in PARVIZI AMINEH, Mehdi, Central Eurasia in global 
politics: conflict, security and development, Leiden: BRILL, 2005, pp. 95-115.  
14 ISAACS, Rico and POLESE, Abel, Between “imagined” and “real” nation-building: identities and nationhood in post-Soviet 
Central Asia, Nationalities Papers, vol. 43, no. 3, 2015, p. 373.  
15 PEYROUSE, Sebastien, The Russian minority in Central Asia: Migration, politics, and language, Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, 2008. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/OP297.pdf Retrieved on 6 October 2017. 
16 OVOZI, Qishloq, Down And Out In Central Asia, RFERL, 9 April 2016. https://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi--economic-crisis-
central-asia-russia-remittances/27664253.html Retrieved on 6 October 2017.  
17 ALLISON, Roy, Regionalism, regional structures…, op. cit. 
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CSTO, and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, SCO). In this regard, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan tend to be considered as examples of bandwagoning with the regional leader, 
although Kazakhstan has showed a more active role in the process leading to the creation 
of the EAEU. Tajikistan’s case could be considered another example of bandwagoning, as 
Dushanbe enjoys full integration within most of the regional organisations and is 
considered a prospect member of the EAEU. 
 
Table 1: Venn diagram showing CA states’ membership in regional organisations. 
 
 
b) Soft and hard isolationism. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have resisted regional 
integration at different levels and stages of their post-Soviet history and have largely 
followed a non-alignment route. As a member of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent 
States) and SCO, Uzbekistan displays a softer isolationist position. In the early 2010s, 
Tashkent re-launched both an ideology of self-reliance (mustaqillik) and balancing 
between superpowers, culminating in 2012 with the decision to quit for the second time 
the CSTO18. Following a harder line of non-alignment, Turkmenistan has refused any 
project of regional integration and pursued closer ties with other international actors so 
to balance Russian hegemony in the neighbourhood. 
 
Despite its overwhelming presence and interests, in the post-Soviet era Moscow has been facing 
increasing competition as a regional leader. In the last decade, China’s engagement has covered many 
spheres: from multilateral cooperation on security under SCO to cooperation on energy and trade. 
Also, it should be noted that, in the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative, CA is intended to play a bridge 
role, connecting European and Asian markets. 
 
When it comes to the US, in the aftermath of the independence Washington offered bilateral economic 
assistance and promoted defence cooperation. Following the steady decline in military presence in 
Afghanistan, the US has paid less attention in the region and let other actors play a greater role.  
 
In light of common Muslim and Turkic ties, the role of Turkey should not be neglected. All CA states 
are members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the Türksoy, while Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan are also part of the Turkic Council, together with Azerbaijan and Turkey. In 2012, Turkish 
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated that Turkey’s primary objectives in the region were support 
to democracy and free-market economy, energy assistance, and strengthening the Euro-Atlantic 
                                                            
 
18 SAMOKHVALOV, Vsevolod, The new Eurasia: post-Soviet space between Russia, Europe and China, European Politics and 
Society, vol. 17 , no. 1, 2016, pp. 82-96. 
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vocation in the region19. Also, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey expanded its educational 
programmes and Turkish language studies in the region under the slogan of ‘Brotherhood of Turkish 
Nations’. With governmental and private funds, Turkey has since then funded a number of joint higher 
education institutions (HEIs) in the region20. As an example, Kyrgyzstan today hosts Kyrgyz Turkish 
Manas University, created in 1995 as the result of a common agreement between Ankara and Bishkek.  
 
Finally, and in opposition to any Euro-Atlantic cooperation, Iran has increasingly asserted its presence 
in CA, and in particular in Tajikistan, where Iranian state-controlled media outlets were launched 
already in the early 1990s and used to spread the ideas of the Islamic Revolution. On this, Vinson has 
noted that “in spite of the challenges, Iran does attempt to project religious/ideological soft power 
that goes beyond the more obvious economic and cultural cooperation”21. 
 
To summarise, in the aftermath of the implosion of the Soviet Union, a number of political and 
economic changes swept across CA countries. As key members of the old Soviet nomenklatura, the 
leaders of the new-born entities were charged with nation-building processes on one hand, and free 
market transition on the other. While at the political level top-to-bottom approaches favoured power 
concentration and increased control by majority elites, since the 1990s much of CA countries’ 
economic survival has relied on natural resources export. Despite increased autonomy in the 
international arena, and the growing number of players interacting in the region, most of the actions 
taken by CA states have confirmed Russia’s significant role in the region, and a substantial cleavage 
persists on the interactions with Moscow. 
 
3. Floating Between Bilateral and Regional Approaches 
 
As a universal development, globalisation has been strongly interrelated with regional processes22. 
Since the end of the 20th century, many geographical areas have increasingly acted as regions, sharing 
political, economic and/or security projects and portraying their authority beyond those regional 
borders. As part of a dialectic process of “global structural change”23, globalisation and regionalism 
have called into question the role and the authority of the Westphalian state and even led scholars to 
look at alternative new world orders, in which regions would play the main role in global affairs, from 
trade to conflict management24. As a major regional actor, the EU has often been portrayed as the 
champion of regionalism and has encouraged regionalism processes throughout the world these past 
decades. In particular, three variations in the EU policy of inter-regionalism across regions were 
identified: “(i) promoting a liberal internationalist agenda; (ii) building the EU’s identity as a global 
actor; and (iii) promoting the EU’s power and competitiveness”25. 
 
In spite of this growing trend, in the early 1990s EU engagement in CA remained timid, lacking not only 
a regional strategy, but also consistent action at the bilateral level. Only by 1996, with the notable 
exception of Turkmenistan, all countries concluded Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) 
                                                            
 
19 SATKE, Ryskeldi, MICHEL, Casey and KORKMAZ, Sertaç, Turkey in Central Asia: Turkic Togetherness?, The Diplomat, 28 
November 2014. https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/turkey-in-central-asia-turkic-togetherness/ Retrieved on 6 October 2017. 
20 FOMINYKH, Alexey, Russia’s Public Diplomacy in Central Asia and the Caucasus: The Role of the Universities, The Hague 
Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 12, no. 1, 2016. 
21 VINSON, Mark, Iranian Soft Power in Tajikistan: Beyond Cultural and Economic Ties, The Jamestown Foundation - Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, vol. 9, no. 52, 14 March 2012. https://jamestown.org/program/iranian-soft-power-in-tajikistan-beyond-cultural-and-
economic-ties/ Retrieved on 6 October 2017. 
22 SODERBAUM, Fredrik and SBRAGIA, Alberta, EU Studies and the New Regionalism: What Can be Gained by Dialogue?, Journal 
of European Integration, 2010, vol. 32, no. 6, pp. 563-582. 
23 HETTNE, Björn. Globalization and the new regionalism: the second great transformation. In: Globalism and the new regionalism. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1999. p. 2. 
24 SODERBAUM, Fredrik, Rethinking Regions and Regionalism, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 2013, vol. 7, pp. 9-17. 
25 SODERBAUM, Fredrik et al., The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism: A Comparative Analysis, Journal 
of European Integration, 2006, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 365-380. 
10 
with the EU, although their terms of agreement appeared consistently more modest when compared 
to those agreed with Ukraine or Russia26. 
 
As key geo-political events of the new century, 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan had an indirect, yet 
profound, impact on Central Asian republics. Following its geographical closeness to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan and the presence of Western military facilities in the field, one could argue that no other 
geographical area was more affected by security developments during this period. In this respect, at 
least at the discursive level, 9/11 opened up windows of opportunity for the EU’s relations with CA. 
First, the West saw the need to act in order to prevent “a second 9/11 from occurring”, showing a 
reactive “disaster mentality that frames the decision-making of Brussels”27. Second, a general 
consensus arose that security affairs such as border controls had to be managed regionally – in 
cooperation with such neighbouring countries as Russia and international organisations28 (which 
would turn out to be challenging). Consistent EU aid became available through the Border 
Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA), which also helped to enhance the Central Asian 
Drug Action Programme (CADAP). As a matter of fact, stability and security became the main 
objectives at the regional level. 
 
In the light of this increased regional interest, 2005 witnessed the creation of the post of EU Special 
Representative for Central Asia (EUSRCA). Two years later, under the initiative of the German 
Presidency, the Strategy for a New Partnership was approved by the European Council. Quite 
ambitiously, the 2007 Strategy aimed at “a balanced regional and bilateral approach” that would 
“foster regional cooperation among the CA states and between those states and other regions”29. 
Bilateral cooperation would be of special importance in answering the special needs and requests of 
the partner countries. The regional approach was meant to deal with all common regional challenges, 
ranging from border issues concerning drug, arms, and human trafficking to environmental and energy 
issues30. 
 
Despite the new discursive engagement, this approach turned out to be quite ineffective, especially 
given the history of non-cooperation within the region. Building international alliances seemed to 
receive the priority over region building, especially in the absence of a ‘common identity claim’. Today 
CA remains an area deprived of any “regional integrationist project with a well-developed institutional 
structure”31, and national players even tend to withdraw from any sort of shared sense of belonging. 
For instance, Kazakh ‘nationalists’ have kept pursuing the discourse that Kazakhstan was not ‘Central-
Asian’, but rather an entity on its own32. One explanation for missing regional attempts could be 
offered by Libman and Vinokurov, who defined the concept of holding-together regionalism: whereas 
in most regions countries gradually strive to strengthen their economic and political ties (coming-
together regionalism, which usually tends to be most effective), post-Soviet states’ attempt to 
cooperate after belonging to one single empire seems to be developing rather slowly. Indeed, this 
phenomenon does not only occur in the Central Asian region, but also in the Caucasus, where most 
states maintain rather cold relationships33. 
 
                                                            
 
26 MELVIN, Neil (ed.), Engaging Central Asia: the European Union's new strategy in the heart of Eurasia, Brussels: Centre for European 
Policy Studies, 2008. 
27 KAVALSKI, Emilian, Central Asia and the rise of normative powers: contextualizing the security governance of the European Union, 
China, and India. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2012, p. 93. 
28 Interview with former member of DG EAC/C4 International Cooperation. 
29 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New partnership, 31 May 2007, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/st_10113_2007_init_en.pdf Retrieved on 15 November 2017. 
30 Ibidem. 
31 KIMMAGE, Daniel, Security Challenges in Central Asia: Implications for the EU’s Engagement Strategy in MELVIN, Engaging 
Central Asia, op. cit., p. 12. 
32 MOLCHANOV, M.A., Eurasian Regionalisms and Russian Foreign Policy, Surrey: Ashgate, 2015.  
33 LIBMAN, A. and VINOKUROV, E., Holding-Together Regionalism: Twenty Years of Post-Soviet Integration, Introduction, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
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After the review of the 2007 Strategy, a broad consensus was reached that the EU had outlined too 
many ‘priorities’ and focused too much on regional cooperation, resulting in limited to no results in 
most cooperation areas34. Serious arguments were given that the EU had to dramatically narrow its 
focus in the region if it wanted to make any difference at all. Also, the budget was too fragmented 
over too many projects on a too long timeframe. There are many other reasons why the EU strategy 
had almost no impact on several cooperation areas: a lack of willingness of the regional actors to 
cooperate; corruption; democratic backsliding and the more prominent financial and political 
presence of Russia, China and other players like the US (which often dwarfs EU assistance). Also, the 
willingness of EU MS itself had been backsliding, as the area was no longer a geopolitical priority. As 
a matter of fact, the attention on Afghanistan around 2001 had been lost to the more recent 
geopolitical tensions closer to home35,36. The question here is, of course, if it is wise to concentrate 
on short-term priorities instead of long-term implications. 
 
Based on this, it was proposed to only focus on matters where actions do have a tangible impact. As 
emphasised by EUCAM (Europe-Central Asia Monitoring) and the European Parliament, key issues to 
address from then on were: bilateral partnerships and closer ties with civil societies (by providing 
political and financial support); support for democratisation and defending human rights; security 
cooperation based on conflict prevention; broader economic cooperation and a simplified 
development policy with a heavy emphasis on education37. In the 2017 Council conclusions38 for CA, 
this list was broadened as emphasis was also put on developing bilateral relationships, good 
governance, the rule of law, and human rights. 
 
Contrary to the EU, Russia never really oscillated between regional and bilateral cooperation, 
consistently privileging the latter. Of course, Moscow does see CA both as a region and as a group of 
states, depending on whether emphasis is on security, where bilateral engagement is preferred, or 
energy infrastructure, where a regional view tends to suit Moscow’s needs39. Straight after the early 
1990s disengagement, a new doctrine promoted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Primakov 
emphasised the need for closer ties with former Soviet republics. Partly inspired by that trend, straight 
after his election, Putin further engaged in the region, securing infrastructure and energy investments 
in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan through a number of affiliated companies. At the security level, the 
prevention of risks of destabilisation in CA became a priority to be addressed by Russia in cooperation 
with CIS Member States. 
 
From the absence of any CA strategy in the 1990s and throughout the late 2000s and the early 2010s, 
Russia implemented a foreign policy that privileges either traditional bilateral relations or a 
‘conditional’ regional approach, ‘imagining’ a region that should include Russia as the key player. The 
clearest example is perhaps offered by the Eurasian Union, where both Russia and three CA countries 
are members.  
 
 
 
                                                            
 
34 Interview with former member of DG EAC/C4 International Cooperation. 
35 JOS BOONSTRA, Reviewing the EU’s approach to Central Asia, February 2015. 
http://www.eucentralasia.eu/uploads/tx_icticontent/EUCAM-PB-34-Reviewing-EU-policies-in-Central-Asia-EN_01.pdf 
Retrieved on 18 July 2017. 
36 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Implementation and review of the European Union – Central Asia Strategy: Recommendations for EU 
Action, January 2016. http://www.eucentralasia.eu/uploads/tx_icticontent/Implementation-EU-Central-Asia-Strategy-
Recommendations-2015.pdf Retrieved on 18 July 2017. 
37 Ibidem. 
38 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Council Conclusions on the EU Strategy for Central Asia, 19 June 2017. 
file:///C:/Users/eboers/AppData/Local/Temp/st10387.en17%20conclusions%20on%20the%20EU%20Strategy%20for%20Cen
tral%20Asia-1.pdf Retrieved on 2 August 2017. 
39 OLIPHANT, Craig, Russia’s role and interests in Central Asia, Saferworld, October 2013. 
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/russias-role-and-interests-in-central-asia.pdf Retrieved on 18 July 2017. 
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4. Willingness 
 
Within the framework proposed to discuss and compare the effectiveness of the EU’s and Russia’s 
CD policy, actors’ willingness or aspiration is a key critical variable. Willingness of a regional 
organisation or a national actor is expressed by the existence of law and policy tools recognising CD 
role, and the presence of committed leaders among public representatives or in private business.  
4.1 Inclusion of CD Goals in Black Letter Law and Policy 
The presence of CD goals in black letter law and policy is the first critical element to assess actors’ 
effective CD leadership in general, and their willingness in particular. At the European level, the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) highlights the role that the EU should have on 
education and culture at the international level. While a clear-cut reference to the concept of CD is 
missing, the TFEU engages the Union to promote educational (article 165), and cultural (article 167) 
cooperation with third countries and relevant international organisations. In both areas, articles also 
put special emphasis on cooperation with the Council of Europe (CoE)40. 
 
In the past years, black letter law willingness has been translated into policy initiatives aimed at 
enhancing EU CD action. The 2007 Communication on a European agenda for culture in a globalising 
world emphasised the role of culture “as a vital element in international relations” and stated that the 
EU would pursue “the systematic integration of the cultural dimension and different components of 
culture in all external and development policies, projects and programmes”41. 
 
However, despite this engagement the Strategy for a New Partnership between the EU and CA 
approved by EU MS in 2007 did not mention culture as a key field of engagement, while at the 
educational level it emphasised support for the development of an e-silk-highway and scholarships 
“for students from Central Asian countries to European universities”42. Since 2007, the Strategy has 
undergone four reviews that have all confirmed the need for further educational mobility and 
cooperation between EU MS and CA.  
 
In 2016, the approval of the joint communication ‘Towards an EU strategy for international cultural 
relations’ by the EC and the European External Action Service (EEAS) marked a new step on CD43. In 
its fourth section, the strategy set two key CD priorities: strengthening EU cooperation in non-EU 
countries, and enhancing mobility of students and researchers. In the Multiannual Indicative 
Programme for Regional Central Asia (2014-2020) two focal sectors were mentioned: regional 
sustainable development and regional security for development. For this first focal sector, socio-
economic development was identified as a key sub-area in order to develop “a dedicated regional high 
capacity, high quality connectivity network for education and research purposes”44.  
 
In Russia, increased interest in soft power initiatives arose in the aftermath of the colour revolutions 
in the mid-2000s, when policy-makers called for tools to counter Western activities and enhance 
Russia’s image in the post-Soviet area. This quest for attraction was translated into a policy initiative 
for the first time in 2008 with the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (hereafter 
                                                            
 
40 HIGGOTT, Richard and VAN LANGENHOVE, Luk, Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations: An Initial, Critical 
but Constructive Analysis, EL-CSID Working Paper, 
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/0bc3be_261d8b4db5344a11abdce75250c5eb54.pdf  
41 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Communication on a European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World, 10 May 2007. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM%3A2007%3A0242%3AFIN%3AEN%3AHTML Retrieved on 16 May 2017. 
42 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, The EU and…, op. cit. 
43 EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE, Towards an EU strategy for international cultural 
relations, 8 June 2016. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=JOIN%3A2016%3A29%3AFIN. Retrieved on 16 May 
2017. 
44 EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE AND EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Multiannual Indicative Programme Regional Central 
Asia 2014-2020, 12 August 2014. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/mip-2014-2020-central-asia-regional-
20140812-en.pdf Retrieved on 6 August 2017. 
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‘Concept’). Drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and signed by the President, the Concepts 
present priorities and objectives of Russia’s foreign policy. While the first Concept appeared in 1993, 
since Putin’s rise to power it has been published every 3 to 5 years (2000, 2004, 2008, 2013, and 2016). 
 
In its fifth section (International humanitarian cooperation and human rights), the 2008 Concept 
highlighted Russia’s commitment “to the diffusion of the Russian language as an integral part of the 
world culture and an instrument of inter-ethnic communication”45. When it comes to Compatriots, that 
are ethnic Russians living abroad, the protection of their “rights and legitimate interests” should be 
coupled with “increased space for Russian language and culture” in those geographical areas. As a 
regional priority, the concept emphasised that “in the humanitarian sphere”, Russia aims at 
“preserving and increasing common cultural and civilisational heritage”46. It should be noted that in 
official documents the word ‘humanitarian’ (gumanitarnyy) has a number of different meanings and 
also addresses cultural exchanges and cooperation47.  
 
The 2013 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly and the 2013 version of the Concept revealed 
slight changes in the cultural sphere, as the promotion of Russian culture in its external relations was 
now also seen as a part of the Kremlin’s new soft power diplomacy. In this version of the Concept, 
soft power was defined as “an indispensable component of modern international relations” promoting 
“Russia's positive image worthy of the high status of its culture and education” and “its participation 
in programs of assistance to developing countries”48. This new way of conducting diplomacy was 
seen as a “toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives building on civil society potential, information, 
cultural and other methods”.49 CIS countries were clearly priority countries for the Russian Federation 
in several areas, and a “particular attention was going to be paid to compatriots living in the CIS 
Member States”50.  
 
The Concept signed by President Putin on 30 November 2016 marked a new step towards a more 
consistent cultural foreign policy. Russia set as its aim to strengthen its role “in international culture; 
promote and consolidate the position of the Russian language in the world; raise global awareness of 
Russia’s cultural achievements and national historical legacy, cultural identity of the peoples of 
Russia, and Russian education and research”51. In the International Humanitarian Cooperation and 
Human Rights section, emphasis was also put “to sustain and develop the network of Russian 
educational institutions abroad, and to support foreign branches and representative offices of 
Russian educational institutions”52. This applied to CIS countries in general, and to EAEU members 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in particular.  
 
The focus on education was also expressed in the Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union between 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (and later also Kyrgyzstan and Armenia) in 2014 in the section on 
labour migration (XXVI). In articles 96 and 97 it was repeated that the certificates of education or 
academic degrees of the Member States would be treated equally and that the procedures of 
recognition would not be necessary anymore53. Interestingly, CD challenges were also addressed 
                                                            
 
45 KREMLIN, The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 12 January 2008. http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116/print. 
Retrieved on 16 May 2017. 
46 Ibidem. 
47 See TSYGANKOV, Andrei P. If not by tanks, then by banks? The role of soft power in Putin's foreign policy. Europe-Asia Studies, 
2006, vol. 58, no 7, p. 1079-1099; 
48 KREMLIN, The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 12 February 2013. 
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186 Retrieved on 
16 May 2017. 
49 SMITS, Yolanda, Russia Country Report, 26 February 2014. http://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/culture/policy/international-
cooperation/documents/country-reports/russia_en.pdf Retrieved on 20 May 2016. 
50 KREMLIN, The Concept of the Foreign…, op. cit.  
51 KREMLIN, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on 
November 30, 2016), 30 November 2016. http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248 Retrieved on 16 May 2017. 
52 Ibidem. 
53 EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION, Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, 29 May 2014. 
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within the National Security Strategy approved by President Putin on 31 December 2015. Developing 
Russian culture at the international level was defined as a key defence national interest and a tool to 
counteract “external cultural and information expansion”54.  
 
Finally, when it comes to general legislation on compatriots, the Russian Federation has undertaken 
obligations to negotiate recognition of educational documents, qualifications and economic degrees 
between CIS member states: a practice that started with signing agreements with Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 1998. In 2004, eleven CIS countries concluded a detailed agreement on 
mutual recognition of equivalence of educational documents on secondary (complete) general 
education, primary vocational education and secondary vocational (special) education. By 2009, this 
system interconnected all CIS countries55. 
4.2 Presence of Committed Leaders 
Black letter law may not be sufficient to advance CD objectives in the absence of effective leadership. 
Leaders not only have to ensure that legal provisions are properly implemented, but should also take 
advantage of unexpected windows of opportunity to further their own vision. When it comes to CD 
efforts in CA, at the EU level a double leadership challenge can be highlighted. A first challenge is 
thematic: despite recent trends, culture remains largely marginal when compared to such ‘harder’ 
spheres as trade and energy. A second and more serious leadership challenge pertains to the region 
itself, that has long been relatively neglected by the EU. In spite of this double marginality, European 
institutions have increasingly shown commitment to both CD and to a more active role in the region.  
 
In 2011, the European Parliament addressed for the first time the need to design a cultural strategy 
for EU external relations. Its resolution emphasised “the importance of cultural diplomacy and cultural 
cooperation in advancing and communicating […] the values that make up European culture”56 and 
paved the way for the Preparatory Action, commissioning a comprehensive study by a consortium of 
cultural institutes and organisations led by the Goethe Institute. In June 2016, High Representative 
Mogherini invested much of her political capital in the Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and 
Security Policy, reaffirming the key role of education and culture “to nurture societal resilience”57. In 
the same month, Mogherini and Commissioner Navracsics presented a proposal to develop an EU 
strategy for international cultural relations. 
 
At the national level, some EU MS have paid special attention to CA. Among others, Germany and 
Latvia have repeatedly pursued CA as their priority on the occasion of their EU Presidency. In January 
2007, straight after the beginning of Germany’s Presidency, Foreign Affairs Minister Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier stressed the importance of the area and emphasised his country would step forward to 
develop a single coherent strategy. Not surprisingly, Berlin’s declarative emphasis and policy action 
was coupled with activism at the national level. As a matter of fact, Germany is to date the only EU 
MS with embassies in every CA country. Stimulated by the presence of a consistent national minority 
in Kazakhstan (about 180,000 inhabitants or 1% of the total population), Berlin’s financial engagement 
has also led to the development of private initiatives. An example is the German-Kazakh University, 
founded in 1999 and run by the non-profit Fund for German-Kazakh Cooperation in Education. 
 
                                                            
 
54 KREMLIN, National Security Strategy, 31 December 2015, 
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31Dec2015.pdf Retrieved on 29 May 2017.  
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In 2015, it was again an EU Presidency that provided a member state with the opportunity to pursue 
CA as a priority. As a country with a similar history, Latvia has been able to turn its historical ties into 
mutual cooperation with CA in general, and with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in particular58. On the 
occasion of the Presidency, Riga pushed at the European level for a review of the CA strategy. To do 
so, Germany, who was equally interested in further engagement with the region, became a key ally of 
the Baltic country. Also, another source of support was Steinmeier’s return to the Foreign Affairs 
Office in 2013, when the Presidency agenda was to be defined. Pastore remarks that Steinmeier’s 
engagement was key to enhancing Latvia’s mission as Germany sent its national experts to Riga to 
assist in the preparation works59. Results of the review were particularly highlighted in the education 
sector: according to an EU national expert, the process increased CA governments’ awareness of the 
deficits in their education systems. As a result, they “invited the EU to cooperate more closely and to 
increase its input”60. 
 
This positive attitude and willingness of EU MS to cooperate more closely with CA was indeed a push 
factor for the EU to engage more closely with the region, and in particular with Kazakhstan. In May 
2016, Federica Mogherini and Erlan Idrissov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, signed the Enhanced PCA61, including 29 key policy areas, among which culture and 
education. A year later, in November 2017, on the occasion of a ministerial meeting between the High 
Representative and the five Central Asian foreign ministers in Samarkand, Mogherini pointed out that 
to bring positive change in the region, the EU was committed to raising “the quality of education so 
that children can reach their full potential”62. 
 
While in Russia CD is a relatively new concept, such expressions as soft power and public diplomacy 
entered Russian political science and press discourse more than a decade ago. Russian soft power 
has been explicitly inscribed in two versions of the Foreign Policy Concept and its use is supposed to 
nurture CIS relations. Of course, one could argue that among Russian elites the concept of soft power 
suffers from a realist ‘conceptual stretching’: for instance, in Vashchenkov’s and Koyazhov’s views, 
soft power should be purely intended as a “means of attainment of national political goals”63. In 
October 2017, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between CA countries and Russia, a statement written by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was 
published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta. Lavrov emphasised that Russia is engaged in “creating a shared 
educational, scientific, and cultural space. It is encouraging that Russian remains a native or second 
language for quite a number of citizens in the region”64. Common cultural and educational ties were 
also raised on the future of the EAEU, “a multilevel integration model aimed at ensuring the 
sustainable development of the entire continent, including, of course, CA”65.  
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5. Capacity 
 
Actors’ willingness is a necessary, but not sufficient, pre-condition to enhance leadership in the realm 
of CD. Black letter law and leaders’ visions and commitment should be coupled with “the resources to 
develop, promote and invest in the specific policy area and thus have an influence”66. In other words, 
effective CD policy is implemented when the actors involved show consistent capacity. For the 
purpose of this paper, two determinants of capacity are taken into account on EU’s and Russia’s CD 
efforts: the financial resources invested and channelled through a number of initiatives and activities; 
and the presence of established and specialised institutions and agencies advancing CD goals.  
5.1 Investing Financial Resources 
Central Asian countries have been receiving direct EU assistance since their independence in the 
1990s. This was first done through the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (TACIS) programme, pursuing democratisation, the strengthening of the rule of law and the 
transition to a market economy in 11 CIS countries and all CA states. At the end of 2006, following a 
comprehensive restructuring of EU aid, TACIS in CA was integrated into a broader instrument – the 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). In comparison with TACIS, DCI is less focused on 
democratisation and the rule of law and targets mainly the reduction of poverty at the global level.  
 
For the period 2007-13, the CA region benefited from a total DCI budget of €635 million (314 million 
for 2007-10 and 321 million for 2010-13), including regional and bilateral aid. When it comes to the 
regional funding, in the education sector, the EU provided a total support of 70 million67, that is, about 
34% of total amount spent for regional cooperation. On bilateral aid, about 39 million were allocated: 
8% of the EU’s budget for Kazakhstan went to education, whilst for Kyrgyzstan this amounted to about 
17%68. In the same period, no educational aid was directly allocated to Tajikistan. 
 
Under the regional multi-annual indicative (MIP) 2014-2020 programme, the total indicative budget is 
€245 million. While higher education remains a “strategic sector for sustainable development and 
poverty reduction in CA”, EU support is channelled under ERASMUS+, providing a complementary 
funding of 115 million for the region. 
 
Figure 1: Donor Matrix of regional EU-funded educational initiatives starting from 201169.  
Target 
countries 
or region 
Title of the project 
Implementing 
organisation 
Budget Duration 
CA CAEP 2: Central Asia Education 
Platform – Phase 2 (CAEP 2) 
GOPA EUR 1 845 000 2015-2018 
CA Erasmus Mundus II EU EUR 13 000 000 2013-2017 
CA TEMPUS IV 2012 for 
Central Asia 
EU EUR 16 611 200 2012-2016 
CA QUADRIGA: Qualification 
Frameworks in Central Asia: 
Bologna-Based Principles and 
Regional Coordination 
Consortium EUR 611 171 2012-2015 
CA TUCAHEA: Towards a Central 
Asian Higher Education Area: 
Tuning Structures and Building 
Quality Culture 
Consortium EUR 1 291 757 2012-2015 
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68 Ibidem. 
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CA Central Asian Education Platform 
(CAEP) 
GOPA EUR 1 820 450 2012-2015 
CA CA Research and Education 
Network 2 
EU/DANTE EUR 3 574 865  2013-2015 
KAZ, 
KYZ, 
TAJ 
Documentation for quality 
assurance of a study programme 
Università degli Studi di 
Genova 
N/A 2011-2014 
KAZ, 
KYZ, 
TAJ 
Modernization and Development 
of Curricula on Pedagogy and 
Educational Management in CA 
Compostela Group of 
Universities 
EUR 769 373 2011-2014 
 
Figure 1 and 2 provide respectively a matrix of region- and country-targeted EU-funded educational 
initiatives starting from 2010. One of the main projects, the Central Asia Education Platform (CAEP), 
started in 2012 and implemented by German consulting firm GOPA (Gesellschaft für Organisation, 
Planung und Ausbildung), was intended to ensure smooth progress on the implementation of the CAEP. 
Details on activities are discussed in 5.2.  
 
Data on students and staff mobility are offered by TEMPUS and ERASMUS MUNDUS reports. The 
Tempus Budget steadily increased from the early 2000s, with €10 million allocated in 2005. Under 
TEMPUS III, over 222 individual mobility grants were awarded, allowing CA staff members to travel 
and work to European HEIs. The majority of grants were offered to Uzbek nationals (122). Since the 
launch of the programme and throughout its four phases, 258 CA HEIs participated in TEMPUS 
projects. In Kazakhstan, a local HEI was project coordinator for the first time in 201370.  
 
Launched in 2004, the Erasmus Mundus programme was designed to support academic cooperation 
and mobility between European HEIs and partner countries. Between 2007 and 2013, mobility for 2124 
students was organised, with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as top departure countries71. 
 
At the bilateral level, consistent financial aid to Kyrgyzstan can be observed. EU support to the 
education sector in the country started in 2011, highlighting “a need to assist the government to 
strengthen the institutional and human resources capacities necessary to elaborate, manage and 
implement the education sector reform with a relevant monitoring system and indicators”72. 
Beginning in 2011, the programme has so far supported 10 projects for about €7.1 million. Among 
other European donors, the German Federal Ministry for Cooperation and Development (BMZ) 
provided between 2010 and 2016 about €16.7 million for regional projects on reforms of educational 
systems, professional education and vocational training73. 
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 Figure 2: Donor Matrix of national EU-funded educational initiatives in CA from 201174.  
Target 
countries 
or region 
Title of the project or action 
Implementing 
organisation 
(applicant) 
Grant awarded Duration 
TAJ Technical Assistance to the Ministry of 
Education and Science in the areas of In-
Service Teacher Training, Learning 
Assessment and Planning, Budgeting and 
Monitoring 
Hulla EUR 7 165 000 2016-2020 
TAJ Technical Assistance to the Ministry of 
Labour, Migration and Employment in the 
area of In-Service Teacher Training for the 
Initial Technical, Vocational Education and 
Training system 
GOPA EUR 3 589 300 2016-2020 
TUM Support to the education sector European 
Profiles S.A. 
EUR 4 625 200 2016-2020 
KYZ Development of financial mechanisms for a 
safe educational environment at schools in 
the Kyrgyz Republic 
Konrad 
Adenauer 
Stiftung 
EUR 1 000 000 2016-2018 
KYZ Strengthening the education attainment 
assessment to affect decisions about 
instructional needs, curriculum and funding 
CESIE EUR 1 000 000 2016-2018 
KAZ ETF: Country Project Kazakhstan European 
Training 
Foundation 
N/A 2011-2017 
KYZ Kyrgyzstan-Bishkek: Support to the education 
sector in the Kyrgyz Republic 
Diadikasia 
Symvouloi 
Epicheiriseon 
EUR 1 465 000 2014-2016 
TAJ Support to the formulation of the bilateral 
programme in education and development of 
baseline studies in Tajikistan 
CFBT 
Education 
Trust LBG 
EUR 248 957 2015-2015 
KYZ Support to increase the level of transparency 
in the Education budget process as a way to 
manage 
public resources more efficiently and 
effectively 
Jarandyk 
Demilge 
Network KG 
EUR 250 722 2012-2015 
KYZ Fostering and monitoring of the education 
reforms in Kyrgyz Republic 
KA Stiftung EUR 500 000 2012-2015 
TUM Further improvement of quality and relevance 
of professional education in central 
Asia/Turkmenistan 
WIG 
International 
Limited 
EUR 2 602 000 2011-2013 
KYZ Towards Improved Vocational Education and 
Training in Kyrgyzstan 
International 
Organization 
for Migration 
EUR 928 961.60 2011-2013 
KYZ Promoting access to modern and innovative 
vocational education system for better 
employability and income of rural population 
ICCO EUR 968 918.36 2011-2013 
KYZ Creating work opportunities for persons with 
disabilities and other vulnerable groups 
through an enhanced cooperation between 
Vocational Educational Training schools and 
employers 
Association 
Federation 
Handicap 
International 
EUR 369 903.28 2011-2013 
KYZ Strengthening social partnership 
development in vocational and educational 
training in Kyrgyzstan 
Gustav 
Stresemann 
Institute 
EUR 492 750 2011-2013 
KYZ Ensuring wider access to the primary 
vocational education and training 
Centre for 
Public Policy 
EUR 152 078.04 2011-2013 
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Although the EU framework programme supporting the cultural sector, Creative Europe, does not 
directly fund CA countries, the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC), a coordinating 
mechanism set up in 2006 to promote EU culture and to build bridges with other cultures, is co-funded 
by Creative Europe75. EUNIC Cluster Funds support joint European activities on the ground upon 
application and are also financed by EUNIC Members. EU MS thus contribute voluntarily, and the EU 
may co-finance projects designed and implemented by EUNIC Clusters around the world. Today CA 
hosts two EUNIC clusters (see 5.2). 
 
When discussing Russian public and private sectors, experts tend to see financial opacity as the rule 
rather than the exception76. Availability and reliability of information regarding public spending remain 
minimal, and the amount of funding received by GONGOs and NGOs is uncertain. Also, private funding 
of cultural events within Russia and abroad is consistent, provided by foundations (Prokhorov ad 
Potanin foundations), energy companies (Rosneft and Gazprom), and banks (Sberbank and VTB). An 
example is offered by the opening of the ‘Centre for the Study and Testing of the Russian Language’ 
in Jalal-Abad, Kyrgyzstan, to which Gazprom International provided financial aid77. Such an example 
should warn the reader: as noted by Vendil Pallin and Oxenstierna, “the fact that a considerable share 
of the work of think tanks is funded through sponsorship and grants from big business with strong 
links to the political leadership suggests that the act share of state funding is less important”78. 
 
At present there are no official documents presenting Russia’s expense for culture in international 
relations. General calculations made by Larionova, Rakhmangulov, and Berenson suggest that Russia 
has become a “re-emerging donor” over the past years79. According to authors’ data, Russia’s total 
overseas development assistance (ODA), including bilateral and multilateral aid, has almost doubled 
since 2010, ranging from 774.5 million US$ in 2010 to 1.54 billion US$ in 2014. At the bilateral level, 
Central Asian countries have been top recipients of Russian aid, accounting for almost 26% of total 
bilateral ODA in 2013. In the region, Kyrgyzstan has received by far the largest amount of bilateral ODA 
when compared to its neighbours, with about 83% of the regional amount received in 2013 (76.73 
US$).  
 
Figure 3: Bilateral ODA from Russia destined to Central Asian countries (US$ millions)80. 
 2011 2012 2013 
Total bilateral ODA 240.40 214.71 361.85 
Central Asia 25.15 55.6 92.18 
Share % 10.45 25.89 25.47 
 
In its capacity as an autonomous federal government agency, Rossotrudnichestvo has also received 
higher funding in the past years. Details on its mission are provided in 5.2. In 2013, Putin issued an 
edict raising its budget from 2 billion to 9.5 billion roubles (i.e. approximately from €48 to €228 million 
at that time) by 2020, although it was later reported that the measure would only apply to individual 
bilateral projects. This could be explained by the decision to decrease the contribution to the World 
Bank, as its decentralised multilateral development aid was too anonymous, and it would not 
contribute to a good image of the country. As such, this rebalancing move towards bilateralism could 
be considered as a strategy towards a more consistent Russian soft power81. 
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The exact budget for exchange programmes to the Russian Federation is also difficult to find, but 
there is a law which gives foreign citizens the right to seek Russian-sponsored places in Russian 
public universities82. Quota for international students to be accepted in Russian universities has been 
rising to a number of 15000 students in 201383. The quota for Kazakh students shows a rising trend: 
in 2014, there were only 150 places available for state-sponsored education, whilst in 2015 there were 
already 240 places and in 2016, this number had risen to 300 places84. The same tendency could be 
observed for Tajik students; for the academic year 2017/2018, 600 student places were made 
available, whilst in 2015, the quota was less than 50085. When allowed for a grant to study in Russia, 
the states’ stipend would cover free education in a chosen university for the entire academic year, a 
monthly stipend (1500 roubles/ 21 euro) and free accommodation, if there are available places at the 
university86.  
 
In March 2017, Lavrov stated that more than 150,000 citizens from CA enrolled in Russian universities, 
and about 46,000 were granted a state-financed place (from the federal budget)87. In 2015, almost 
three out of four Kazakh students moving abroad chose Russia. The second destination was China, 
with about 14,000 students. Only a very small number moved outside the region: 2,000 Kazakh 
students enrolled in the US Higher Education system, and 1,600 chose to go to the UK88. In general 
terms, the number of CIS students coming to study in Russia has doubled between 1994 and 2008. 
On top of that, it is no longer a secret that the Russian security services’ (FSB) academy has been 
welcoming Central Asian students. As an example, in July 2017 Kyrgyz news agency Kabar reported 
that 11 students graduated from the Academy, and that Kyrgyz security services counterparts 
attended their graduation ceremony in Moscow89. 
5.2 Establishment of Institutions Fostering and Dedicated to Cultural Diplomacy 
For CD purposes, in CA the EU mainly relies on the activities organised through the EUNIC clusters in 
Almaty, Kazakhstan, and Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The latter cluster is rather small, with only the British 
Council, the Goethe-Institut and the Institut Français as members. The cluster in Almaty, on the other 
hand, consists out of many organisations: the Alliance Française, the Goethe-Institut, the British 
Council, the General Consulate of Hungary, the Società Dante Alighieri, the Spanish and Swiss 
Embassies, the Akimat of Almaty, the EU Delegation in Astana, the KIMEP University, Czech and 
Turkish Airlines, and the Arman Cinema Center90. 
 
National institutes either organise events together, under the umbrella of EUNIC (for instance film 
festivals, language courses, dissemination events on EU higher education, and the like), or on an 
individual basis, representing their own country rather than the EU. The British Council, for example, 
has set up a broad range of English language courses and exams, so students can obtain proficiency 
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certificates. They also provide information for local students on how to go abroad and study in the UK 
and how they can apply for scholarships and funding through their website and special Study UK 
Exhibitions91. In the area of culture, a Creative Central Asia Forum was organised and brought together 
people from the creative industries of Kazakhstan and the UK92. Another project led by a coalition 
made up of the British Council, the Kazakh-British Technical University, Almaty Akimat and the Almaty 
Development Centre, and funded by a grant from the EU, is the ‘WeAlmaty’ project. WeAlmaty is a 
three-year initiative that aims to develop Almaty into a ‘smart city’ by supporting new forms of 
cooperation between civil society organisations, local authorities and the private sector93.  
 
The Alliance Française performs similar activities: it provides information about French Higher 
Education system and offers language courses and corresponding DELF/DALF exams to obtain 
certificates. In terms of culture, it organises ballet performances and concerts, gastronomy days, and 
several exhibitions regarding French culture (history, art, and photography among others)94. Also, in 
2014, following an inter-governmental agreement between France and Kazakhstan, the Institute 
Sorbonne-Kazakhstan was launched in Almaty. Today the Institute offers Kazakh, Russian and 
French-language Bachelor and Master's programs in a number of disciplines. 
 
Similarly to other national organisations, the Goethe-Institut offers language courses on several 
levels, certificates, and cultural events95. In Kazakhstan, Germany has created a number of 
instruments addressing the German ethnic minority: these include “more than 20 branches of the 
ethno-cultural association Wiedergeburt (Revival), […] the German Academic Exchange Service, […] a 
German drama theatre and radio station and a German language newspaper”96. Some other European 
countries such as Poland and Bulgaria have also kept institutional ties with their diaspora 
communities in Kazakhstan (respectively about 34,000 and 4,500 people). There are several Polish 
schools in Kazakhstan, together with some associations and three Houses of Polish Culture (Domy 
Kultury Polskiej)97. A poetry competition and a music festival are also organised every year98. When it 
comes to Bulgaria, the ethnocultural center Zlata, created in Astana in 2011, organises art and music 
festival, and facilitates student exchanges99. 
 
Whilst CD is mostly managed on the national level by EU MS and EUNIC, educational initiatives have 
been largely set up by EU institutions and organs. An example is the special platform CAEP which 
helps implementing the European Education Initiative for Central Asia. It mostly addresses vocational 
education and training, and higher education, in conjunction with the Erasmus+ Programme, within 
the CA region. CAEP tries to enhance inter- and intra-regional cooperation simultaneously, as to 
strengthen the education reforms in the region, but also to better coordinate all the donors’ actions. 
 
In pursuing CD efforts, national institutes are often supported by European embassies on social 
media. In a study assessing the diplomatic e-strategies of 14 European embassies in Kazakhstan on 
Facebook, Collins and Bekenova found that, instead of aiming at a ‘sense of belonging’ (engagement 
with the local audience in order to achieve social acceptance and cooperation), the majority of the 
countries’ posts were about self-representation. Especially Belgium, Latvia, Sweden, the UK and Italy 
were good at promoting their own country’s education, tourism, culture, language, and the like. British 
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and German embassies, in contrast, seemed to reach an adequate level of engagement with the local 
audience and in the local language100. 
 
During recent years, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been investing considerably in its 
cultural infrastructure abroad. It has set up different tools to promote the Russian language and 
culture, often in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and Science. Russia simultaneously 
focuses on its outreach towards ethnic Russians living abroad. In December 2012, President Putin 
announced that the government was going to promote culture and language in its international 
relations. As stated by Smits, six elements seem to be part of Russia’s strategy “1) image building; 2) 
outreach to the Russian diaspora community; 3) dissemination of the Russian language; 4) 
international academic and student exchange; 5) scheme of bilateral ‘years’ or ‘seasons’ of culture 
with foreign countries; and 6) cultural heritage preservation”101. 
 
Compared to EU MS, Russia had less tools to promote culture in external relations, but has been 
increasing the number of its agencies and centres. In 2008, the Ministry has set up the Federal Agency 
for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International 
Humanitarian Cooperation, commonly known as Rossotrudnichestvo. Among others, the agency 
supports Russian language teaching in the CIS and provides educational material to approximately 
7,000 schools around the world were the Russian language is taught. Rossotrudnichestvo coordinates 
the Russian Centres for Science and Culture, promoting cultural and educational exchanges with the 
many countries where it is represented. In 2012, the Agency had 59 centres for science and culture 
over the world102. In 2018, this number increased to 72 centres in 62 states, and 23 representatives of 
the Agency serving in another 21 Russian Embassies across the globe103. Such centres are also 
established in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan104. Although these networks have 
the word ‘science’ in their name, there is only limited involvement in science and technology – mainly 
through the organisation of exhibitions and conferences. They are mostly dedicated to the 
dissemination of Russian language and culture: they are cultural centres, in the usual diplomatic 
sense. Their role is also to strengthen links with the Russian expatriate community105.  
 
Another important foundation regarding Russian culture is Russkiy Mir (Russian world), which was 
jointly set up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science in 2007 and 
is supported by both public (the federal budget) and private funds. It has many partners in the Russian 
education, literature and diplomacy sector and forges ties with educational organisations around the 
world. Russkiy Mir’s main goals are the popularisation of the Russian language, support of the Russian 
diasporas, attracting foreign students to study in Russia and organising educational exhibitions. It 
also provides grants for several projects linked to the Russian language, such as Russian foreign 
media abroad or the organisation of seminars on the history and culture of Russia106.  
 
There are also several smaller bodies that promote Russian culture and language. The Pushkin 
Institute, for example, is a teaching and research centre that provides Russian courses and issues 
language certificates meeting international standards107. Gosfilmofond is a National Film Foundation 
of Russia supporting the promotion of Russian films through the organisation of film festivals. Also, 
a non-profit institution dealing with art development in Russia, the Russian Academy of Arts (RAA), 
supports exhibitions of Russian artists abroad and those of foreign artists in Russia. Finally, another 
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non-profit institution, the Russian Council of Academic Mobility (Rosam), is charged with promoting 
international exchanges of students and scholars108.  
 
Along with media, Russian language studies and scholarship programmes do indeed play a big role 
in Russia’s soft power strategy in the post-Soviet region. Especially towards CA countries, the Kremlin 
uses a wider range of ‘softer’ tools like educational exchanges and scholarship programmes109. This 
is somewhat opposed to the approach used in the Baltic states and Ukraine, where Russia often 
employs more manipulative methods and a more ‘aggressive’ style when it comes to its public 
diplomacy. It should be noted that such moves may have an opposite effect on Eurasian neighbours, 
as they still hold feelings of ‘imperialistic behaviour’ towards Russia, despite the shared narrative of 
common cultural values and political habits. Therefore, Russia has also placed most of its education 
and scholarship programmes under its development assistance and economic integration policies. 
To compete against educational initiatives from the EU, the US, China and Turkey, Russia has 
encouraged national state-owned universities to recruit CA students and establish partnerships in the 
region110. CA countries now represent a major transboundary market for Russian universities, due to 
geographic proximity, economic interdependence and the status of Russian as a second language.  
 
6. Acceptance  
 
To measure the effectiveness of CD efforts in CA, acceptance is another key variable. Even when 
actors display significant law and policy instruments and capacities, a lack of acceptance might 
undermine CD efforts in the region. To measure acceptance in CA, two sub-variables are taken into 
account: committed citizenry, measuring the level of engagement at the civil society level, and buy-in 
from political elites. 
6.1 Committed Citizenry 
In general terms, a committed citizenry can play a key role “in voicing dissent or support for specific 
initiatives”111. Gauging how CA citizens react to EU’s and Russia’s CD policies and initiatives gives 
substantial room for adaptation and, if need, reorientation of the action. This is especially true when 
one considers that, in general terms, culture and education are easier fields for citizens’ involvement 
compared to such areas as human rights and democratisation. 
 
Nevertheless, in discussing committed citizenry in CA, three points should be stressed. First, in spite 
of some similarities, this study has already emphasised that CA countries display substantial 
differences when it comes to civil society’s marge de manoeuvre. For instance, while in such countries 
as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, participation in cultural events organised by European centres does 
not present any difficulties, in Turkmenistan individuals are obliged to justify their visits112. A second 
and more important point pertains to the complexity of providing valid quantitative surveys to 
measure civil society’s view-point on EU’s and Russia’s CD. As noted by Peyrouse, “there are very few 
survey institutes active in the region and the ones that do operate have scarce financial and human 
resources. There are no independent institutes in Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan, and in Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan those that exist sometimes face substantial hurdles”113. While effective 
surveys have been increasingly conducted in the region, most of them give only general ideas on how 
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CA citizens view the EU and Russia and do not provide substantial indications on feelings and 
reactions about CD activities.  
 
Bearing in mind these observations, this paper looks at the EDB Integration Barometers, measuring 
post-Soviet citizens’ attraction to a country114. Promoted by the Eurasian Development Bank’s Centre 
for Integration Studies and the Eurasian Monitor, the Barometer measures three dimensions of 
attraction: political, economic, and sociocultural. While it is hard to claim the existence of a causal 
link between EU’s and Russian CD policies and their respective perceptions, surveys can shed some 
light on the EU’s and Russia’s general clout at the cultural level. 
   
In the survey, Russia is one of the available choices for ‘potentially attractive countries’ together with 
‘Great Britain’, ‘Germany’, ‘France’, and ‘other EU countries’. Responses are therefore grouped by four 
attraction vectors: ‘CIS region’, ‘EU’, ‘other countries’, and ‘autonomy’, that is, no international 
attraction. As such, one should note that EDB surveys assess the interest in EU MS rather than the 
interest in the EU as such. 
The 2016 fifth wave of the survey included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan while the 2014 
third wave of the survey also displayed results from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan115. To provide a 
comprehensive view, both surveys were therefore used in this paper. Among the 20 questions 
included in the survey, three displayed a clear-cut CD value: 
T7: ‘For which of the listed countries would you say you have an interest in their history, culture, and 
natural geography?’ 
T9: ‘Please indicate which of the listed countries you would like to travel to for studies. (Only asked of 
respondents younger than 35 years old) Or: Which of the listed countries would you like to send 
your children to for studies? (Only asked of respondents 35 years and older)’. 
T12: ‘In your opinion, from which countries do we need to invite into our country more actors, writers, 
and artists, and buy and translate books, movies, musical productions, and other cultural works?’ 
 
Table 2: Respondents’ answer to T7 ‘For which of the listed countries would you say you have an 
interest in their history, culture, and natural geography?’. Data from EDB Integration Barometer 2014 
and 2016. 
 
 
 
In T7, CA’s respondents displayed a unanimous preference for Russia over EU MS. A slight difference 
was observed for Kazakhstan (6 points) and Kyrgyzstan (8 points), while among Turkmens the 
attraction gap was the highest of the region (20 points). In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Turkey’s 
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significant attraction was confirmed, while India was the in the top 3 most attractive actors in 
Tajikistan together with Russia and the EU. 
 
Table 3: Respondents’ answer to T9 ‘Please indicate which of the listed countries you would like to 
travel to for studies (or send your children to for studies)’. Data from EDB Integration Barometer 2014 
and 2016. 
 
 
T9, introducing the subject of education, offered some differences. In the region, Uzbekistan was the 
only country where respondents slightly preferred an EU member state over Russia for educational 
purposes (-2%). A small gap was observed in Kazakhstan (4%), while a major difference was shown in 
Tajikistan (30%) and Turkmenistan (25%). Interestingly, in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the 
US was third most preferred destination after Russia and EU countries. Turkey and China were also 
suitable choices respectively in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. 
 
Table 4: Respondent’s answer to T12 ‘In your opinion, from which countries do we need to invite into 
our country more actors, writers, and artists, and buy and translate books, movies, musical 
productions, and other cultural works?’. Data from EDB Integration Barometer 2014 and 2016. 
 
 
Finally, in T12 respondents from all CA countries consistently showed a preference for Russian arts 
over European. Like for T7 and T9, Kazakhstan displayed the lowest gap (20%). Also, in the country, 
France and Germany were in the top 3 together with Russia, while Turkey and India were among the 
most attractive countries according to Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s respondents. A possible 
interpretation of this wider gap between European and Russian attraction could be related to the use 
of Russian as lingua franca in the region together with the role that Russian media play. On the latter, 
Huasheng has noted that “although no statistical data on this matter is available, there is no doubt 
that Russian news and social media sites are widely popular”116. 
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Overall, EDB Barometers seemed to confirm that Russia remains the most attractive actor when it 
comes to CD efforts in the region. It should also be noted that, in spite of the high results in the socio-
cultural part of the survey, the fifth wave of the survey from 2016 highlighted how in general terms 
“Russia’s position in the countries of the Central Asian sub-region has weakened”117. The report 
stressed a decline in Tajikistan, due to a decrease in the attractiveness of Russian financial resources 
and a desire to reorient cooperation with other actors of the international arena. In Kazakhstan, a fall 
in the interest of Russian goods was also observed. As such, one should remark how, despite a 
number of substantial challenges faced by Moscow, the Barometer still displayed Russia’s strong 
cultural role in the region. However, while Russia plays a leading role, yet it is no longer solitary as a 
number of actors (the EU, the US, China, and Turkey) have increasingly strengthened their CD position 
in the region.  
 
Furthermore, the survey analysis tends to highlight a correlation between openness and orientation 
toward CD activities from both actors, in line with Peyrouse’s view: “Paradoxically, the two countries 
with the most Russophile elites – Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – are also the most oriented toward 
Europe”118. Finally, a last point focuses on the features of the survey itself. At present EU countries 
lack their own tools to assess perceptions through quantitative surveys in the region. While much has 
been said on the challenges faced by survey institutes in the region, regional barometers analysing 
CD actions are key to monitoring and pursuing any needed reorientation.  
6.2 Buy-in from Political Elites 
Assessing political elites’ approval in CA is another strong tool to measure acceptance on CD efforts. 
Declarations and engagements from national and local politicians are vital to shape public debate and 
to strengthen or undermine international actors’ public image. While an exhaustive overview is beyond 
the reach of this paper, this part attempts to gauge elites’ general views on EU’s and Russia’s CD 
based on current literature and political declarations.  
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Astana has pursued what President Nazarbaev defined in the 
1990s as a multi-vector foreign policy119. Yeltsin’s disengagement in the region throughout the decade 
opened up new windows of opportunity and space for cooperation with the major world powers. In his 
first two years of power, Kazakhstan signed agreements with Russia, the US, and China. 
 
When it comes to the EU, it appears that Kazakh elites perceive it as having “substantial economic 
leverage, but barely any political clout compared to Moscow, Washington, or Beijing”120. While there 
is a clear recognition of the EU as champion of democratic values, its visibility in the economic sector 
appears weaker. At the cultural level, Kourmanova recognised a slight increase in EU visibility 
“through the work of EU delegations and relevant EU MS embassies that help to promote European 
culture and standards, as well as broader global values”121. In a number of interviews given by Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Roman Vassilenko recognised EU MS’ educational efforts in the country122, 
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while at the national level Kazakh ambassador in Berlin pointed out that Germany remains a strategic 
partner in the development of the system of dual technical and vocational education123.  
 
Interestingly enough, Astana’s recent decision for a switch of the Kazakh language from Cyrillic to 
Latin by 2025 was seen by many as an attempt to emphasise the country’s distance from the Russian 
cultural sphere124. For instance, on this, Gushchin noted that “the switch to Latin today is evidence of 
a long-term trend which shows that Kazakhstan does not belong to the Russian world in full”125. As 
an attempt to adapt to the current Latin-dominated scientific environment, Nazarbaev pointed out that 
this would not erase Russia’s key role for Astana. In other words, Kazakhstan “will not forget Russian 
culture and the Russian language. We learned world culture using the Russian language, and it will 
always remain with us”. As such, Nazarbaev’s moves and declarations seem to confirm that, in 
pursuing a multi-vector and pragmatic foreign policy, Astana has also adopted a multi-vector cultural 
policy, seeking to floating between Russia and the West, including the US., the EU, and Turkey. 
  
In spite of this repositioning, one should not forget that current Kazakh elites remain strongly 
russophile and support further integration with Moscow. On this, Ó Beachàin and Kevlihan mention 
the example of Miras, an elite private primary and secondary school in Almaty126. Children are offered 
two different language streams: either Kazakh and Russian or Russian combined with English, while 
a Kazakh-English solution is not available. In the authors’ view, the anecdote reveals how “Russian 
remains the de facto language of elite education and communication and an important gateway 
language, particularly in the hard sciences, engineering and military studies”127. 
 
Similarly to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz elites have displayed a multilateral orientation and supported 
cooperation with both actors. Juraev remarks that despite its role as one of the most generous donors 
in the country, the EU delegation in Kyrgyzstan has not increased its visibility128. While political elites 
are well aware of the support received by both the government and CSOs, EU CD efforts remain 
unknown among the general public.  
 
When it comes to Russia, Kremlin’s soft activism in Kyrgyzstan eventually paid off, despite some 
controversies around the role of Tolstoy’s language. In 2012, Foreign Minister Kazakbayev’s 
declaration put an end to the debate. By recalling that questioning its official status was a mistake, 
Kazakbayev emphasised how “the Russian language helped the Kyrgyz to join international science 
and culture”129. Helped by a substantial Russian-friendly media environment, at present Kyrgyz elites 
display a clear orientation towards Russian culture and education. As such, Saunders observes that 
“Russian remains a marker of the older elite and reflective earlier patterns of internationalism”130, 
while Kosmarskaya notes that Russian language current status “should be viewed not only via a top-
down approach (Kyrgyz state language policies, support of the RCLS by Russia), but, more 
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importantly, through the prism of micro-level family/individual life trajectories and survival or social 
promotion strategies”131. 
 
Balancing has also been a key policy choice for Tajik elites. As a result of the civil war that was fought 
immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Dushanbe developed relations with the EU later 
than its neighbours. In his qualitative study, Olimov found that Tajik elites appreciate European 
educational and cultural programmes but they refrain from enhancing EU influence in the country, as 
this could endanger the authoritarian rule of the regime132. Among the general public, it was also found 
that European institutions enjoy a more positive perception than EU MS. 
 
Similarly to its neighbours, a review of the role of the Russian language was attempted in the last 
decade. In 2009, a bill removing the constitutional role of Russian as a language for inter-ethnic 
communication was prepared. Later President Rakhmon clarified that its status would remain 
unchanged, and that "acts of the President and government in the Republic of Tajikistan are accepted 
in Tajik and Russian languages, dozens of newspapers and magazines are published in Russian, 
which, in my opinion, is evidence of the real state of things”133. In discussing relations with Moscow, 
the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs website emphasised how “Tajikistan and Russia are historically 
linked by centuries-old tradition, close interaction and friendship, and a deep interpenetration of 
cultures”134. 
 
In Uzbekistan, CD trajectories have been heavily influenced by both domestic events and foreign 
policy orientations. In 2005, strong EU reactions to the Andijan protests and the request for an 
international investigation were toughly rejected by Tashkent. Imposed straight after the massacre, 
sanctions were finally removed in 2009 under Germany’s initiative. Yuldasheva acknowledged the 
existence of a large consensus among Uzbek elites of the EU’s positive role in the country, noticing 
that “EU assistance is particularly visible in sector such as higher education, the health and social 
system”135. As recently as in 2012, the Ministry of Higher and Specialised Secondary Education 
recognised the role of the EU Tempus programme “on the overall modernisation process, including on 
the improvement of university facilities, the installation of modern computer and laboratory 
equipment, and the development of modern teaching materials and textbooks”136. 
 
In spite of foreign policy ups and downs and the desire to modernise the education sector, due to 
common Soviet legacies Russia remains a clear cultural and educational reference in Uzbekistan. 
Throughout the last decade Uzbek elites have welcomed the establishment of three international 
branch campuses of Russian universities: Tashkent hosts divisions of the Moscow State University 
of Lomonosov, Plekhanov Russian University of Economics and the Russian State Oil and Gas 
University of Gubkin. As such, Russian educational activism in the country has contributed to further 
curriculum diversification and academic competition and its role has been increasingly recognised by 
Uzbek elites137. 
 
Finally, Turkmenistan offers perhaps the least opportunities for buy-in from political elites for both the 
EU and Russia. Peyrouse observes that “even the educated, and the governmental, bureaucratic and 
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business elites are largely unaware of the EU and how cooperation could be forged”138. While signs of 
a possible rapprochement were identified recently and President Berdimuhamedov stressed that 
relations with Moscow are of a special nature, Russia’s CD mission in Turkmenistan remains much 
more problematic than it is in Ashgabat’s neighbours as local elites see Moscow’s activism in a 
suspicious light139. 
 
Overall, this section seems to confirm a correlation between the degree of openness of the country 
and a more positive vision of CD efforts from both the EU and Russia. This is the case of Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan and applies also to Tajikistan to a certain extent. Relations with Russia have been 
somewhat more controversial even in the most Russophile countries, and political elites have 
attempted to call into question the role of Russian language and culture in the countries. Relations 
with international actors remain more complicated in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as their elites are 
cautious of any action that could undermine both the authoritarian rule and the isolationist path. 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This paper sought to provide a qualitative analysis of the EU’s and Russia’s CD efforts in the CA region. 
In doing so, it also discussed the actors’ different history of cooperation with CA states. As a 
newcomer in the region, the EU designed a comprehensive strategy in the mid-2000s and became a 
valuable donor. European engagement remains however not comparable to the political, economic 
and cultural legacies that still link Russia to CA. As such, this paper has confirmed that, in spite of a 
declining position, Russia remains the major foreign actor in CA. At the declarative level, black letter 
law and policy showed increased awareness on the role of CD, and CA countries were mentioned as 
part of Moscow’s fundamental areas of interest. In terms of capacity, Russia has managed a deep 
restructuring of its development assistance in the past years, with increased funding and the creation 
of a number of public, mixed, and private institutions and agencies dealing with CD goals. Also, by 
stimulating student exchanges, language courses and scholarship programmes, Russia has mainly 
tried to build CD activities on common values and shared language, culture and history. Finally, on the 
level of acceptance, Russia’s culture and education remain highly attractive among citizenry and 
elites in the whole region. 
 
When it comes to the EU, CD efforts have led to mixed results. Despite a strong financial engagement 
that makes Brussels one of the largest regional donors, the EU’s contribution is not highly visible, and 
its influence has been declining. One of the explanatory reasons might be the inconsistent approach 
towards the region when it comes to bilateral or regional financial engagement. On top of that, too 
many priorities were outlined before the new strategy in 2007, which left a lot of financial aid shattered 
across many ‘key areas’. Interestingly, the EU is more attractive in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where 
countries’ elites are the most Russia-oriented at the regional level. Two non-CD-related factors seem 
to influence the EU’s and Russia’s different CD results in the region. On the one hand, it is indubitably 
true that in the current international context Central Asia occupies a very low position in the EU foreign 
policy agenda. This is somewhat opposed to the early and mid-2000s context, when geographical 
proximity to Afghanistan was a serious concern for Western policy-makers. On the other hand, as 
noted by Laruelle and McGlinchey, the presence of pro-Russia media and “deep cultural and historical 
ties, such as the presence of a substantial Russian minority in Kazakhstan and half a million Kyrgyz 
labour migrants in Russia, help to ensure that Russian state narratives resonate”140. But whilst the EU 
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has shown a rather temporary and instable excitement for the region, some EU countries such as 
Germany and Latvia have always been active in pushing the EU agenda regarding CA. Even before 
that time, these countries have been pursuing their own policies in the region (and targeting small 
ethnic minorities), which has eventually paid off in terms of stable relationships.  
 
While at present Russia remains the de facto CD leader, this analysis also emphasized that, similarly 
to the EU, Russia’s efforts have not been successful in the whole region. While some countries have 
been bandwagoning with Russia, others have followed individual paths and rejected closer ties. Even 
in the most Russophile CA states, the attitude towards Russia is sometimes referred to “forced 
interdependence” or “let the sleeping dog where it is”141. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, 
Moscow’s idea and use of soft power portray CA as a fundamental part of the ‘Russian world’. And 
while most of CA states welcome cooperation with Moscow, as noted by Juraev, their elites have been 
able “to play cats and mouse”142 and to make balancing exercises, as in the case of Kyrgyzstan, which 
willingly accepts financial help from both Russia and the EU. As such, in the current global 
environment, Brussels could and should see its cultural diplomacy as a tool to balance Russia’s ‘soft’ 
assertiveness. 
 
By assessing the EU’s and Russia’s roles in Central Asia, this paper sought to shed some light on 
competing cultural narratives and practices in the shared neighbourhood, where both actors have 
been consistently engaging. As CD studies are a relatively new academic field, further research on 
different areas of the post-soviet space (for instance Eastern Partnership member states, the Baltics, 
Transcaucasia, and the like) would represent a valuable mapping exercise, uncovering the features of 
the EU’s and Russia’s conflicting strategies. At a non-comparative level, assessments on the 
mandates of the cultural actors targeted for CD activities, and on the level of coherence between 
policies formulation and implementation would also be precious to fully comprehend CD efforts in the 
post-soviet space. 
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